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The nature of putative semantic anomalies in schizophrenia is controversial. Metaphor 
interpretation and use provide a useful methodology with which to probe semantics since 
metaphors are critical in reasoning processes and in how conceptual knowledge is organized. 
The first study examined free speech for figurative language. The second study explored 
whether emotional versus non-emotional metaphorical language interpretation elicits 
differences in the tendencies to produce idiosyncratic (bizarre) or literal interpretations or use 
of other metaphors to describe the meaning of a metaphor. The third study examined the 
interpretation of time metaphors. We expected the time perspective in ambiguous sentences to 
be differentially influenced by previously presented unambiguous sentences of a specific 
perspective, either events moving relative to a stationary observer (moving-time) or an 
observer moving relative to a stationary event (moving-ego). First, we found that patients 
used a similar amount of figurative language as control participants. Second, we did not find 
any difference between the groups in terms of idiosyncratic interpretations, although patients 
did interpret more metaphors literally and controls utilized more figurative language. Third, 
we did not find evidence of a difference between the groups in terms of time perspectives 
influencing ambiguous target sentences differentially. As operationalized here, the 
interpretation and use of metaphors is similar in patients with schizophrenia to that of healthy 
control participants. To the extent that metaphors recruit semantic processes this area of 








It is unequivocal that in many patients with schizophrenia communication can at times 
be difficult to understand due to its tangential nature or frank incoherence. However, the 
underlying mechanisms of this remain unclear. One popular theory is disruption in the 
semantic memory system, resulting in overinclusive thinking (Cameron, 1939; Payne, 1960; 
Chen et al., 1994), differences in the spreading of activation through the network (Maher, 
1983; Moritz et al., 2002; for a meta analysis see Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2008), a 
disorganization within the semantic system (Paulsen et al., 1996), or a disruption of 
expression at the semantic level (McKenna and Oh, 2005),. However, studies adopting 
alternative methodological frameworks (i.e., not priming paradigms) and different statistical 
approaches have not found support for notions of a difference in the putative boundaries of 
categories (Elvevåg et al., 2002), or underlying semantic structure and organization (Elvevåg 
and Storms, 2003; Cohen et al., 2005; Elvevåg et al., 2005). Indeed, we have argued that some 
techniques (e.g., multidimensional scaling and clustering techniques to analyze category 
fluency and triad comparison data) employed to suggest increased variability is attributable to 
semantic deficits fail statistical requirements concerning consistent and reliable variability 
across participants, which renders many such techniques ill-suited for clinical populations 
where there is an implicit assumption about more variance (Elvevåg and Storms, 2003). 
Although such findings do not refute the hypothesis of semantic deficits in schizophrenia per 
se, they highlight the need for tests and methodologies better suited where variability within 
and between patients exists.  
We have previously suggested alternative methodologies and statistical approaches to 
this interesting set of issues. One approach has been to collect typicality ratings of categories 
(e.g., how typical is milk of the category food) to establish whether patients and controls 
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agree on how representative an item is of its category. Typicality predicts performance on 
category-related tasks, such as speed of categorization. Our examination of consistency and 
reliability of typicality ratings (i.e., interindividual consistency within patients and controls 
and between control and patient groups) revealed similar correlations both between and 
within each group. The inter-patient consistency derived was high compared to that from 
fluency and triad tasks, and semantic representations in schizophrenia paralleled those in 
healthy participants (Elvevåg et al., 2005). However, this raises the question then of what 
aspect of semantics accounts for the unusual speech and comprehension deficits in 
schizophrenia. It is of course possible that anomalies are present in more value-laden 
concepts. Therefore, we have examined concepts differing in variance (i.e., more variance in 
less well defined and value-laden categories), and adopted a variety of methods - including 
feature verification - to directly assay core semantic knowledge (as compared with category 
fluency which is susceptible to pragmatic influences). As expected, patients performed 
worse than controls and this varied depending upon concept: less for familiar concepts 
(mammals), average for most, but increasingly worse for value-laden concepts (family). 
These findings again highlight that methods adopting statistical „averaging‟ run the risk of 
being flawed in clinical populations (Storms and Elvevåg, 2010). 
Priming provides an attractive paradigm to probe the mechanisms underlying the 
unconventional discourse, and its methodology underlies the influential theory that 
abnormalities accessing semantic representations - through spreading activation within a 
network - is the core mechanism for subsequent problems forming meaningful and coherent 
speech (Goldberg and Weinberger, 2000). However, there are many limitations with this 
framework most notably that language involves processes other than spreading activation 
between associated words. In the example “Marcella ate the spaghetti with the marinara 
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sauce,” and “Marcella ate the spaghetti with a large fork,” “spaghetti” is associated with and 
primes both “sauce” and “fork” (i.e., denotes accompaniment in the first sentence and 
instrument in the second sentence). However, understanding the first sentence requires 
inferring the person ate “sauce”, but understanding the second sentence requires inferring she 
used a fork to eat “spaghetti.” Therefore, to address some of these issues, we recently assessed 
language understanding by explicitly probing interpretations of novel noun-noun expressions, 
and found that patients both interpret concepts similarly to healthy people and use similar 
cognitive processes to access these concepts (Elvevåg et al., 2010a). Thus, we concluded that 
the production of unconventional speech cannot be attributable to how patients represent and 
combine concepts, since this is strikingly similar to that of controls. Nonetheless the question 
remains as to what could account for this atypical discourse. It is of course possible that there 
could be a specific problem in combining concepts into more complex semantic expressions 
or in specific types of concepts, namely emotionally-laden concepts and expressions. Indeed, 
it is clear that previous experimental frameworks have not fully captured the very essence of a 
language production problem, because language is „colorful‟ due to the enormous numbers of 
metaphors that we use. Of note, metaphors are not simply linguistic devices but rather are 
core components of reasoning and inferential processing, and indeed fundamental to how we 
organize and map our conceptual knowledge (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). “For 
example, one of the root metaphors in Western industrialized cultures is TIME IS MONEY, 
leading to the easily understood, almost literal, metaphorical expressions: Don't waste my 
time. Spend your time wisely. It cost me a whole hour” (Blasko, 1999; p.1677). Nonetheless, 
most of cognitive neuroscience‟s operationalizations of „language‟ are rather devoid of these 
more „colorful‟ aspects, yet there is clearly a central role of metaphors in defining language 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2000). Thus, we sought to probe this more „colorful‟ 
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aspect of language, and employ more personally relevant (i.e., „emotional‟) noun-noun 
phrases, since one may be able to interpret noun-noun phrases „literally‟ but the metaphor 
forms have to be interpreted „figuratively.‟ For example, “roller-coaster dinner” could be 
interpreted metaphorically but it could also be interpreted literally as in “dinner eaten while 
traveling on a roller coaster.” In contrast, “that dinner is a roller coaster” has to be interpreted 
figuratively. There are some reports that patients may interpret phrases in literal ways, or 
choose the dominant meaning despite the context suggesting an alternative meaning (Langdon 
et al., 2002; Iakimova et al., 2005; Langdon and Coltheart, 2004). Speculatively, 
„interpretations‟ of the world via discourse may contribute to some of the symptoms that 
patients display in which a confusion in interpretation may paint a picture of the world that is 
quite scary or hostile. In keeping with our approach of employing direct methods to probe 
language and semantics, our current three studies examined interpretation and production of 
metaphors directly.  
Additionally, we examined „emotional language‟ as we expected discussion of 
emotions to provoke figurative speech. Moreover, emotions play a crucial role in regulating 
our interactions with our social environment. The amygdala, located in the medial temporal 
cortex, is central in both normal and pathological emotional behaviors, especially fear 
(LeDoux, 2000). The amygdala has been found to display strong activity in response to angry 
and fearful faces (e.g., Morris et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 2003), and in response to negatively 
affective verbal stimuli (Isenberg et al., 1999; Strange et al., 2000; Garolera et al., 2007). 
Importantly, amygdala dysfunction has been reported in schizophrenia, and a study comparing 
patients and their unaffected siblings reported a pattern of response (to negative face stimuli) 
that was similar to that of healthy controls, thus concluding that the inability of patients to 
normally recruit the amygdala in fearful situations in not likely to be a heritable phenotype 
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that is related to risk for schizophrenia but rather related to disease and specifically treatment 
(Rasetti et al., 2009; for a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of the amygdala in 
schizophrenia, see Anticevic et al., in press/2011). Indeed, impairments in emotion perception 
and production are widely documented in schizophrenia, although may vary as a function of 
modality (e.g., visual versus auditory) (Vaskinn et al., 2007), and importantly “emotion 
perception is a mediator between neurocognition and functional outcome as assessed with a 
social problem-solving task and thus a key factor in understanding functional outcome of 
schizophrenia” (p.279; Vaskinn et al., 2008). 
 
2. PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-one in-patients who were enrolled in a residential program of the university 
hospital in Kortenberg (Belgium) participated. They all met criteria for schizophrenia as 
specified by DSM-IV, were medicated (see Table 1), and received between €3.50 and €5.00 
for their time. Their level of intelligence (IQ) was assessed by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Test (average = 95.68; range 71-122). Symptoms in patients were assessed by the Psychosis 
Evaluation tool for Common use by Caregivers (PECC, which is a comprehensive, 
standardized, computerized assessment instrument that evaluates a broad range of functional 
and symptomatic outcome measures (De Hert et al., 2002) and were clearly moderately ill 
(see Table 2), and this was also evident from moderate symptoms or moderate difficulties in 
overall functioning as captured by the Clinical Global Impression (CGI; Guy, 1976) and 
Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF; Hall, 1995) scales (see Table 3). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1, 2 and 3 HERE 
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Twenty-one voluntary control participants were matched to the patients on age (patients‟ 
average age = 33.52 (±8.10) and controls‟ average age = 33.81 (±8.54); p = 0.91) and level of 
education (p = 0.59) [Footnote 1]. Controls‟ IQ was not assessed. Participation in our three 
studies took approximately 25 minutes. All participants provided written informed consent 
after the study details had been explained to them. Dutch was the first language for all 
participants. Conversations were recorded electronically. Ethical approval for the study was 
obtained from the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences 
of the University of Leuven (Belgium). 
 
3:  STUDY 1: METAPHOR USE DURING FREE SPEECH 
3.1: BACKGROUND 
The first study sought to investigate metaphor use during free speech. Any putative 
deviance in semantics should manifest itself as a difference in the manner in which language 
is explicitly used. Examining free speech, it has been reported that compared to patients with 
borderline personality disorder and nonpsychiatric (minor) medical diagnoses that patients 
with schizophrenia (matched for intelligence and years of education) employed more 
metaphoric or evocative language, but often inappropriate to its context even though each 
speech segment was semantically correct (Billow et al., 1997). Importantly, this study found 
that patients with schizophrenia did use as much appropriate figurative language as compared 
to the two other groups. Thus, the purpose of our first study was to expand on this when 
patients were to describe emotions.  In light of Vaskinn‟s et al. (2007) findings in 
schizophrenia of an impairment in auditory - but not visual - emotion perception, we 





3.3.1: MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE 
Participants were asked to describe a personal event in which they experienced the six 
emotions respectively: (1) anger, (2) fear, (3) happiness, (4) sadness, (5) love and (6) lust. 
Each emotion was asked about individually, and once they were finished describing one 
personal event the next emotional word was given as a cue. We examined the use of 
spontaneous metaphors in their descriptions.  
 
3.4: RESULTS 
Only seven out of the 21 patients employed one or more metaphors to describe a 
personal event concerning a specific emotion. Metaphors were used when talking about a 
personal event concerning the emotions anger, fear, sadness and love, but not when describing 
a personal event concerning happiness and lust. In the control group eleven participants used 
at least one metaphor to describe the six emotions. In contrast to patients, all emotions were 
described at least once using a metaphor. Four patients and five controls refused to describe a 
personal event considering the emotion lust, maybe due to a personal taboo concerning 
discussion of lustful experiences. Patients used on average 0.80 metaphor (range 0-6) to 
describe a personal event in response to a presented emotion, and controls used 1.23 (range 0-
8) (F(1,40) = 0.62; p = 0.44). 
 
3.5: DISCUSSION OF STUDY 1 
Our first study examined free speech for figurative language and found that patients 
used a similar amount of figurative language as controls. Although this may seem surprising, 
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clinicians often respond to psychotic patients in a manner that suggests they think patients 
actually believe the literal content of the figurative statements, whereas this is less frequently 
the case in non-clinical conversation (Wynn et al., 2009). In other words, in many settings we 
may inadvertently be more attentive to figurative language in patients than in a non-clinical 
conversation. Although not statistically significant, it is noteworthy that in our current study 
several patients employed metaphors when describing the emotion „fear‟. This merits future 
exploration of any connection with specific symptoms such as paranoia or the hearing of 
derogatory voices. However, overall this free speech study resulted in few metaphors being 
generated. Therefore, we next examined metaphor interpretation as the study design would 
ensure more responses. 
 
4:   STUDY 2: METAPHOR INTERPRETATION 
4.1: BACKGROUND 
In the second study we examined metaphor interpretation of the same set of emotions 
as in Study 1, specifically with a view to establish whether patients employ more literal or 
bizarre interpretations and whether presentation of metaphors prompts metaphorical 
descriptions. Previous research with proverbs found that patients generated interpretations that 
were more concrete (Sponheim et al., 2003; Brüne and Bodenstein, 2005) literal and 
idiosyncratic (Shimkunas et al., 1967; Harrow et al., 1972). We focused on metaphorical 
utterances, which are less complex than proverbs, but expected them to follow a similar 
pattern, as proverbs are a category of metaphorical language. Specifically, we hypothesized 
patients would interpret metaphorical sentences more literally and idiosyncratically, and be 
less likely to use metaphorical language in general. Also, we sought to investigate whether 
there were differences in interpretations between emotional and neutral presented 
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metaphorical sentences in patients versus controls. As in Study 1, no distinction was made to 
the participant between positive and negative affective material. 
 
4.2: METHODS 
4.2.1: MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE 
A series of 30 metaphors was presented to the participants - one per piece of paper - 
each which was also read out aloud to them. The list of metaphorical sentences was inspired 
by Kövecses (2000) (see Appendix A). Participants were asked to provide the meaning of the 
presented metaphor. The emotions examined were the same as in Study 1, namely anger, fear, 
happiness, sadness, love and lust. Every emotional sentence referred to either a fluid in a 
container (e.g., She was boiling with anger), insanity (e.g., He was insane with fear), a social 
superior (e.g., His actions were completely dictated by fear), a natural force (e.g., Waves of 
depression came over her) or a captive animal (e.g., She brings out the beast in him). Three 
extra sentences that did not fit into these categories were included since they are commonly 
used prototypical expressions in Dutch regarding these emotions.  Based upon a pilot study, 
Study 2 was divided into two parts (eight emotional and seven neutral metaphors) and 
interspersed within the three components of Study 3 so as to improve alertness of participants. 
Four different presentation orders were used. 
 
4.3: RESULTS 
We computed non-parametric randomization tests, comparable to ANOVA‟s with one 
between-subjects variable (patients, controls) and one within-subjects variable of type-of-
metaphor (emotional metaphors, non-emotional metaphors) to analyze the data from 
Experiment 2, because of violations of homogeneity of variances. (For details about 
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randomization tests, see Edgington & Onghena, 2007).  Analyses were carried out for three 
different dependant variables: literal interpretations, metaphorical interpretations, and 
idiosyncratic interpretations.  
First, we compared patients and controls in terms of the number of literal 
interpretations. There was a main effect for group with patients providing significantly more 
literal interpretations than controls (on average 0.48 (range 0-3) versus 0 (range 0-0); p < 
.01).  The type-of-metaphor variable also yielded significance (p<.05) with emotional 
metaphors leading to less literal interpretations than non-emotional metaphors (on average, 
respectively, 0.33 (range 0 – 2) versus 0.62 (range 0 – 3)).  The interaction between the group 
and type-of-metaphor variable was not significant (p = .65).  Second, we compared patients 
and controls in terms of the number of metaphorical interpretations. Again, there was a 
significant effect of the group variable, but with patients providing less metaphorical 
interpretations (on average 3.66 (range 0-9) versus 6.95 (range 0-16); p < .01).  There was 
also a significant effect of the type-of-metaphor variable with emotional metaphors prompting 
more metaphorical interpretations (on average 3.0 (0-11) versus 2.3 (0-8); p < .05) but the 
interaction with the group was not significant (p = .15). Third, we compared patients and 
controls in terms of the number of bizarre/idiosyncratic interpretations. The effect of the 
group variable was not significant (p = .15), since patients generated a similar amount of 
bizarre interpretations (on average 1.10, with a range of 0 – 5) as control participants (on 
average 0.52, with a range of 0 – 3).  There was no significant effect of the type-of-metaphor 





4.4:  DISCUSSION OF STUDY 2 
 We explored whether the groups were dissimilar in metaphorical - emotional and non-
emotional - language interpretation, such that there were variations in the amount of 
idiosyncratic or literal interpretations or use other metaphors to describe the meaning of a 
metaphor. Although we did not find any group differences in idiosyncratic interpretations, 
patients did interpret more literally but controls more figuratively. An interesting future study 
- with sufficient statistical power - would be to investigate a possible relationship between 
such linguistic use and specific symptomatology in patients, such as thought disorder or 
hallucinations. Indeed, metaphors have a central role in the formation and maintenance of our 
basic concepts (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Therefore, the fact that patients interpreted 
more metaphors literally is extremely interesting in light of suggestions that figurative 
thinking in the „pre-delusional period‟ may pave the foundation for later delusions: “At some 
stage, thoughts such as „am I like someone possessed by a devil‟ become „I am possessed by a 
devil‟ ” (Rhodes and Jakes, 2004 p.6; our italics). Although highly speculative, it is possible 
that “the delusional statement is a literal statement about aspects of the world or self which 
are transformed by metaphor” (p.15; Rhodes and Jakes, 2004). 
 
5:  STUDY 3: USE OF METAPHORS CONCERNING TIME 
5.1: BACKGROUND 
Our third study examined the use of metaphors concerning time. Societies vary on the value 
placed on „clock time‟ (Levine, 1997), and thus there are differences in how concepts of time 
form part of our everyday discourse, and affect our mental models of the world (e.g., in 
reading – Ditman et al., 2008). However, the concepts and metaphors associated with time are 
central in everyday function and are frequently evident in discourse. Indeed, language dictates 
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use of „space frames‟ of references to organize our time metaphors (Boroditsky, 2001; 
Gentner et al., 2002), and is consequently used in a figurative way to make time and relations 
between temporal events easier to understand (Bender et al., 2005). In many societies, it is 
assumed that the past is known and the future is unknown and thus temporal metaphors are 
based upon the experiential correlations Known is behind ego (i.e. behind a „moving ego‟ on a 
path), Unknown is in front of ego (i.e. in front of a „moving ego‟ on a path) (Núñez and 
Sweetser, 2006). In other words, time can be conceptualized in two different perspectives, 
namely moving-ego (ME) perspective, where time is considered to be a stationary entity, or 
moving-time (MT) perspective, where time is seen as a dynamic entity (Clark, 1973). An 
example of a ME sentence could be “We have passed the deadline”, with movement directed 
to the future (We have passed the deadline in the direction of the future). According to a MT 
perspective this sentence would be “The deadline has passed (us)”, as in this case the deadline 
passes us in direction to the past (McGlone and Harding, 1998).  
When people activate one of these two perspectives (moving-time or moving-ego) 
during the reading of unambiguous temporal sentences, this might influence interpretation of 
a subsequent ambiguous sentence in favor of the perspective previously used. Alternatively, 
information about temporal ordering is only used when reading unambiguous sentences, 
without considering the underlying perspectival entailments. In the latter case people would 
not show a preference for the previously activated perspective (McGlone and Harding, 1998). 
We sought to examine how this might be affected by schizophrenia given their problems in 
temporal judgments, which are likely intertwined with working memory limitations (Elvevåg 
et al., 2003, 2004). From a phenomenological perspective, the seemingly disrupted 
consciousness of time may be due to disruptions synthesizing time relationships underlying 
the formation of Gestalt perceptions. Speculatively, such temporal problems may be related to 
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misperceived causal roles (Elvevåg et al., 2010b) and subsequent delusion formation (e.g., of 
control, reference or persecution).  
 
5.2:  METHODS 
5.2.1:  MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE 
As mentioned earlier, Study 3 was divided into three parts and interspersed with the 
two parts of Study 2 so as to increase participants‟ alertness. This study was a replication of 
Experiment 2 of McGlone and Harding (1998), albeit in patients and in Dutch. Since the 
purpose was to establish whether perspective information was utilized when interpreting 
temporal language the study was conducted only on Wednesdays. 
Forty-five sentences about unique events were split into three blocks of 15 sentences 
(see Appendix B). There was one moving-ego (ME) context block, one moving-time (MT) 
context block and one mixed context block. The mixed context block was always presented as 
the second block. After four unambiguous context sentences one ambiguous target sentence 
was presented. This sentence could be interpreted in accordance with both a moving-ego and 
a moving-time perspective. Our goal was to establish whether the perspective activated earlier 
would influence subsequent interpretation of the target sentence. 
Each block consisted of three target sentences with a time indication of the 
spatiotemporal verbs „moved forward‟ (voorwaarts verplaatst; e.g., “The meeting, originally 
scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two days”), „pushed back‟ 
(teruggeschoven; e.g., “The party, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been pushed 
back two days”) and „advanced‟ (vervroegd; e.g., “The reception, originally scheduled for 
next Wednesday has been advanced two days”). The four context sentences that belonged to a 
target sentence were presented in four random orders. The sentences were read out aloud 
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(e.g., “We are coming up on the wedding in two days”; “The concert passed two days ago”). 
Since the study always took place on Wednesday, the only possible answers were Monday or 
Friday. Thus, after four unambiguous context sentences one ambiguous target sentence 
always followed (e.g., “The meeting originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been 
moved forward two days”), and the task was to determine whether the event would occur on 
Monday or Friday. 
 
5.3:  RESULTS 
Thirteen patients and 18 controls obtained 100% accuracy on the 36 unambiguous 
sentences. Five patients and two control participants made one error. There were two patients 
who gave two incorrect answers to the unambiguous sentences questions. One patient and one 
control made 16 and 11 mistakes respectively, and because of their high amount of errors 
these two people were excluded from further analyses [Footnote 2]. All remaining participants 
obtained an accuracy level of at least 94.44% which was considered sufficient for inclusion in 
subsequent analyses. 
The response to the ambiguous sentences was the dependent variable. Answers were 
coded as ME or MT consistent. „Monday‟ was an MT consistent and Friday was a ME 
consistent response for the verbs „moved forward‟ (voorwaarts verplaatst) and „advanced‟ 
(vervroegd). Considering the verb „pushed back‟ (teruggeschoven) „Monday‟ was a ME 
consistent response whereas „Friday‟ was a MT consistent answer. 
 




ME and MT consistent responses are presented by context-list condition in Figure 1. It 
is apparent that controls interpreted the verbs „advanced‟ (vervroegd) and „pushed back‟ 
(teruggeschoven) in a similar manner, which patients did also [Footnote 3]. Thus, it is 
possible that information concerning temporal ordering was only used when reading 
unambiguous sentences, without considering the underlying time perspectives. Alternatively, 
it may be that the Dutch equivalents of the verbs „advanced‟ and „pushed back‟ are not as 
ambiguous as we had assumed. Concerning the spatiotemporal verb form „moved forward‟ 
(voorwaarts verplaatst), responses were at chance level. For example, to the sentence “The 
meeting, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two days”, ten 
patients and seven controls in the moving-ego context claimed the meeting was rescheduled 
for Friday, which was a moving-ego consistent answer, and ten patients and 13 controls 
concluded that the meeting would take place on Monday. In the mixed context condition with 
the ambiguous sentence “The communion, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been 
moved forward two days”, ten patients and six controls claimed the communion would take 
place on Friday, which was a moving-ego consistent answer. Finally, regarding the moving-
time context, using the ambiguous sentence “The auction, originally scheduled for next 
Wednesday has been moved forward two days”, eleven patients and 10 controls claimed the 
auction would take place on Monday, which was a moving-time consistent answer. Thus, 
there was no clear preference for specific answer for this verb form. 
 
5.4:  DISCUSSION OF STUDY 3 
Our third study was motivated by the assumption that interpreting time metaphors 
would be a sensitive assay of putative problems in time perspectives in patients. However, we 
did not uncover evidence of such differences in ambiguous sentences after previously 
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presented unambiguous sentences of specific time perspectives, namely moving-time or 
moving-ego. In contrast with McGlone and Harding (1998), we did not find the interpretation 
of target sentences to be influenced by previously presented time perspectives. Importantly, 
results were similar for patients and controls.  
 
6:  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We sought to utilize metaphor use and interpretation as a window into the nature of 
putative semantic anomalies in schizophrenia. The first two studies involved metaphoric 
language in general as well as emotional material. The third study concentrated on time 
metaphors. As operationalized here, the interpretation and use of metaphors was overall 
remarkably similar in patients to that of controls. Therefore, to the extent that metaphors 
recruit semantics this appears intact in schizophrenia.  
Surprisingly emotion was not such a strong modulator of language as expected, and it 
did not elicit any noteworthy different responses from patients. This is likely because the story 
of emotional experiences in schizophrenia is magnitudes more complex than our 
conceptualization affords. A recent elegant fMRI study that examined valence and arousal 
ratings of the stimuli experiences, as well as trait level measures of anhedonia, found that 
patients‟ muted ventral striatal and left putamen responses to pleasant stimuli were also 
associated with less pleasant ratings of the actual stimuli (Dowd and Barch, 2010). Moreover, 
these differences in brain physiology were mediated by self-reported trait anhedonia, thus 
suggesting that the differences in brain activation have less to do with diagnosis per se and 
more to do with the trait anhedonia as this was related to physiological responses in both 
patient and control groups. Thus, future conceptualizations and experimental 
operationalizations will be more sensitive to subtle differences if the role of a behavioural 
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phenotype - such as trait anhedonia - is considered. In the current study, we did not examine 
anhedonia and acknowledge that such measures would have been valuable, although limited 
given our small sample size.   
Indeed, our study‟s sample size limits our statistical power to examine many 
interesting characteristics associated with a heterogeneous illness such as schizophrenia, 
notably illness chronicity and duration, effects of medication and most importantly the effects 
of symptoms. Although all patients were symptomatic, hence their enrollment in the treatment 
program, a future larger study would be able to establish to what extent metaphor use and 
interpretation is modulated by specific types of symptoms, notably thought disorder. Also, 
many cognitive processes, specifically working memory, play an important role in the 
understanding and production of metaphors (Blasko, 1999; Kiang et al., 2007). Therefore, a 
study in which patients and controls are well characterized neuropsychologically would be 
able to examine whether any potential differences in metaphors use and interpretation are due 
to limitations in working memory (Goldberg et al., 1998) or deficits in episodic memory 
(Skelley et al., 2008) that are so characteristic of schizophrenia. 
In conclusion, we adopted a methodological framework that challenged the semantic 
system through metaphor interpretation and use. We examined free speech for figurative 
language, emotional versus non-emotional metaphorical language interpretations, and also 
interpretations of everyday time metaphors. Overall, we found the interpretation and use of 
metaphors to be very similar in patients to that of controls, and conclude that the semantic 
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Footnote 1: Education is compulsory until 18 years of age. Educational level was coded as 
follows; 1 = primary school, 2 = secondary school type BSO (vocational training), 3 = 
secondary school type TSO (technical training) or ASO (academic training), and 4 = higher 
education (bachelor or master). Patients had an average educational level of 2.86 (±0.86) and 
controls scored on average 3.00 (±0.89); p=0.59. 
Footnote 2: Although the responses were rated unblinded we are confident that the 
interpretation of the metaphors is unequivocal as two ratings of the same sample but a year 
apart produced near perfect test-retest reliability (across the sample a total of 1 error only). 
Footnote 3: Except one patient who gave a MT consistent answer to the sentence with 
spatiotemporal verb form „pushed back‟ and a ME consistent answer to the sentence with 







Table 1: Medication use in patient sample 
 










1       (3.8) 
6       (23.1) 
5       (19.2) 
1       (3.8) 
6       (23.1) 
2       (7.7) 
5       (19.2) 
 
Mean dose Chlorpromazine equivalents 
 
Monotherapy antipsychotic 
Combination of antipsychotics 
- second-gen. antipsychotics only 






- Mood stabilizer 
- Somatic medication 
 
514mg   (SD 768) 
 
16     (76.2) 
5       (23.8) 
2       (9.5) 
3       (14.3) 
 
 
6       (28.6) 
11     (52.4) 
9       (42.9) 
7       (33.3) 






Table 2: Scores from the psychosis evaluation tool for common use by caregivers 
variables (PECC) in patients (Panel A) and scores in patients from the Clinical Global 
Impression (CGI) and Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scales (Panel B) 
 
 Mean     ±SD 
PECC total score 
- Positive symptoms 
- Negative symptoms 
- Depressive symptoms 
- Excitement 
- Cognitive symptoms 
42.1     16.3 
7.5       3.9 
10.8     5.4 
9.4       4.2 
7.6       3.8 




 Mean     ±SD 
Clinical Global Impression  
Global Assessment of Functioning  
4.1          1.2 








Figure 1: Percentages of moving-ego (ME) and moving-time consistent (MT) answers for the 
three spatiotemporal verbs in three different contexts. Patient data are shown in panels A to C 
and control data in panels D to F. Categories on the horizontal axes represent the perspectives 
used in the unambiguous context sentences. The vertical axes represent the percentages of 
responses to the ambiguous sentences consistent with a certain perspective.  
„Friday‟ is a ME consistent and „Monday‟ a MT consistent answer for the spatiotemporal 
verbs „moved forward‟ and „advanced‟. Regarding the verb „pushed back‟, „Monday‟ is a ME 
consistent and „Friday‟ a MT consistent answer. 
With respect to the verb „pushed back‟ (Panels B and E), most answers were ME consistent, 
whereas for „advanced‟ (Panels C and F) most responded with a MT consistent answer, 
irrespective of the previously used context perspective. Concerning „moved forward‟ (Panels 
A and D), most responses are at (or close to) chance level for all context perspectives. No 
evidence was found for the influence of the previously used context perspective on the 












Appendix A: Study 2: Metaphor interpretation. 
Emotion metaphors (16) 
Anger (3) 
Fluid in a container: She was boiling with anger 
Natural force: It was a stormy meeting 
Extra: Fume was coming out of his ears 
Fear (2) 
Fluid in a container: The sight filled her with fear 
Natural force: She was engulfed by panic 
Happiness (3) 
Fluid in a container: He was overflowing with joy 
Insanity: They were crazy with happiness 
Natural force: She was swept off her feet 
Sadness (2) 
Insanity: He was insane with grief 
Natural force: Waves of depression came over her 
Love (3) 
Social superior: She was completely ruled by love 
Natural force: He swept her off his feet 
Extra: You could feel the electricity between them 
Lust (3) 
Fluid in a container: His whole body exploded in passion 
Captive animal: She brought out the beast in him 
Extra: He was burning with desire 
Neutral metaphors (14) 
That surgeon is like a butcher 
His brain is a computer 
Landlords are vampires 
Her memory is like a sponge 
His laugh is like a magnet 
Her best friend is an anchor 
That job is like prison 
Lawyers are sharks 
Some countries are like dynamite 
Cigarettes are time bombs 
Talking to some people is like taking sleeping pills 
You must keep money moving 
Life is like a journey 
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Appendix B: Materials from Study 3: Use of metaphors concerning time (adapted from McGlone & 
Harding, 1998) (C = context sentences; T = target sentences) 
Moving-Ego context list  
C: We are coming up on the wedding in two days. 
C: We passed the deadline two days ago. 
C: We will arrive at the exam date in two days. 
C: We reached the anniversary two days ago. 
T: The meeting, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two days. 
 
C: We will reach graduation in two days. 
C: We will have passed the closing ceremony in two days. 
C: We came up on the quiz two days ago. 
C: We arrived at the performance date two days ago. 
T: The party, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been pushed back two days. 
 
C: We passed the holiday two days ago. 
C: We will arrive at the election in two days. 
C: We reached the gallery opening two days ago. 
C: We are coming up on the barbeque in two days. 
T: The reception, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been advanced two days. 
 
Moving-Time context list 
C: The wedding is coming up in two days. 
C: The baptism ceremony passed two days ago. 
C: The date of the game will arrive in two days. 
C: The birthday party reached us two days ago. 
T: The auction, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two days. 
 
C: The boat trip will reach us in two days. 
C: The festival will have passed in two days. 
C: The diner party came up on us two days ago. 
C: The day of the movie premiere arrived two days ago. 
T: The journey, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been pushed back two days. 
 
C: The explosion passed two days ago. 
C: The theatre play will arrive in two days. 
C: The demonstration reached us two days ago. 
C: The operation is coming up in two days. 
T: The day off, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been advanced two days. 
 
Mixed-context list 
C: The hearing is coming up in two days. 
C: We passed the wine tasting evening two days ago. 
C: We will arrive at the city trip date in two days. 
C: The funeral reached us two days ago. 
T: The communion, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two days. 
 
C: The migration will reach us in two days. 
C: We will have passed the road works in two days. 
C: We came up on the zoo visit two days ago. 
C: The horse race date arrived two days ago. 
T: The helicopter flight, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been pushed back two days. 
 
C: The concert passed two days ago. 
C: We will arrive at the museum in two days. 
C: We reached our dream destination two days ago. 
C: The festivities are coming up in two days. 
T: The cruise, originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been advanced two days.  
